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THEORY OF FAIT ACCOMPLI BLACKMAIL

DE: JULY 16, 1991. NOTES ON THE THEORY OF THE FAIT ACCOMPLI.
FAIT MALACCOMPLI].

The attempted fait accompli is like the coup d'etat, surprise attack but also like blackmail. Like the coup d'etat and the surprise attack it relies on speed which has a number of subsidiary requirements or characteristics. But like blackmail and bribery or trade it is also an alternative to violence; violence as a form of power or influence, or means of affecting one's purposes. Unlike violence it is non destructive, it does not cause death, injury, physical pain or physical destruction of property. It is thus like threats, or blackmail, coercive rather than as a form of power, based on physical manipulation. It aims then to produce compliance or collaboration, even though as in blackmail, that compliance or collaboration is induced by primarily by threat rather than trade.

In other words it may achieve collaboration in a situation in which the other party is in every respect or in most respects, worse off than before but collaborates for fear if he does not or she does not, they will be a still worse off though perhaps mutually worse off along with the initiator. So it is thus in the class, it achieves the effect of threat and it does this virtually by using threats. It may also use some small amount of violence and certainly physical movement but relatively small compared to other more violent approaches that are possible when compared to the ordinary run of events and compared to the violence that is threatened. Yet another way of looking at the fait accompli is that it shifts the burden or onus of first violence on to the other side.

It's as though a full scale theory of the fait accompli just emerged in my head as I awoke which has twenty more dimensions than the one I had. Why is first use or first violence a special burden? Because either though a violent or non-violent move may be equally illegal or illegitimate; the destructive one or the violent one is usually treated or regarded as more illegitimate, as worse, it revokes greater sense, it is more to be deterred, subject to more guilt or shame or condemnation. Why 's that? Because it not only does something which is forbidden, that violates rights but it causes physical pain, it destroys property, irreversibly. It usually injures by-standers or innocents, more people that are injured otherwise by the non-violent means. It violates more rights, it violates generally the rights of others and the violation is regarded as greater and more irreversible. It is also regarded as more humiliating, in many instances, although that may or may not be

true. It can in some cases be less humiliating because the fait accompli, surprise attack or other event which is less humiliating in its moderate or non-violence, may be more humiliating in making a fool of the victim.

The fait accompli is also like the surprise attack, coup d'etat, and perhaps in some cases blackmail, aims to prevent any major response, any effective response, any, what amounts to muscular movement or actual movement, action, real action by the victim. It may do this by paralyzing response or by taking advantage of the fact that response takes time and moving within the period of time that any effective response takes so that the response is not actually a possible, but impossible in time to prevent.

What is it that is prevented? As I say it may be actually paralyzing; that what is prevented is movement, the victim becomes incapable in a real sense of making the movement. This may be accomplished, or may be aided for example in the case of a surprise attack by hitting or by destroying command and control elements, so that centralized control is impossible or so that information can hit sensors or communication links so that warning information is prevented that will cause or alert the attack in the limited, complex sense in which information does cause a response. So that what one attacks is the awareness that the response is appropriate or needed, or it may involve hitting forces or special links of access, bridges, roadways, the vehicles to forge the attack, the fuel links are either attacked; or bribed into an absent or unalert condition as in the Mafia case or in the Godfather movies, the bodyguard is typically either killed or bribed in the first stage.

But, at any rate, these physical pieces of either bribery, threat, or destruction are instrumental to prevent a response in the larger sense or in a later sense by the combination of coercion, threat and other means, because what is truly made impossible is for the victim to prevent a move by deterrence rather than physical destruction. It confronts him with the possibility of averting or reversing his situation in which the opponent, the aggressor controls a place, set of people or a situation by preventing and precluding his having the physical capability to do so or by threatening him if he attempts to achieve that mission of control or power or authority. He will either have to do so by violence or if he attempts it he will receive great violence. In other words, one hopes to coerce him. [TAPE CUT].

The aim now of the fait accompli, is to achieve the situation then where the victim cannot prevent or reverse one's control of a territory or area or situation by coercion but would have to undertake either trading or bribery or violence. Now why does the violence still have an onus attached to it, a burden

even though, in this case, it would be generally seen as legitimate violence, violence in the vindication of rights or the protection of rights? And the answer is that violence is bad in itself and not only worsens an illegitimate act but it can make an otherwise legitimate act, questionable, controversial or illegitimate because it threatens to harm, perhaps both parties, and innocent parties, third parties to a degree that is not justified by the vindication of rights or the reversal of a wrong.

Notice that I've introduced here the language of rights and presently of authority as opposed to the economist language of utilities even when that economist language is broadened by the awareness of coercive situations in which moves are possible in which not everyone is better off. But these are the questions then of legitimacy and presently authority, and rights is another language to describe this. Of course many of these dimensions are suggested by the very name here: accomplished fact, fait accompli.

[FOOTNOTE: WHY IS THIS ALWAYS PRESENTED IN FRENCH? WHAT IS THE ASSOCIATION OF THIS TO THE FRENCH LANGUAGE OR PRACTICE OR HISTORY OR EXPERIENCE OR DIPLOMACY? PERHAPS BECAUSE FRENCH WAS THE LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY FOR A LONG PERIOD. WHY WAS THAT AGAIN AS OPPOSED TO SPANISH, ENGLISH, DUTCH OTHER EMPIRES?].

There is an onus of violence. Why? Because it has an uncertain aspect to it so it shifts the burden of uncertainty in a way from one side to the other. Also, it has an element of uncontrollability to it which is one reason for the uncertainty. It is, of course, destructive and on third parties as well. It tended to be mutually destructive since it is uncontrollable and uncertain; it has the potential for hurting both sides and possibly to a very large degree, an uncontrolled degree, it may be unstable, explosive, exceed normal bounds, go beyond boundaries, escalate to the mutual destructiveness of both and very specifically in the initial victim.

The consequences and even the actions are likely to be, to some degree, unplanned and uncalculated and ineptly performed or be different from what is intended. It's the difference then between war and threat, or trade, as was felt most acutely in the case of Iraq where even though everyone agreed that the initial move was unjustified, many, many people normally hawkish that is normally willing, sometimes even eager, to see violence used, were wary of violence even in the pursuit of right as possibly a worse evil, a greater evil than acceptance of the wrong or at least a very slow righting of the wrong during which many people would suffer and even be killed by the Iraqis who were exercising effective authority.

Now, we get to this question of the dimension of authority. These problems associated strictly with the exercise of violence incidentally causing the intense physical fear, a kind of terror which again is regarded as a bad in itself even with respect to the survivors or people who were not physically injured. They're subject to intense physical terror which is a bad. All of these make violence a questionable means to be used only when - quote "necessary". And when necessary includes not only the absence of alternatives but also some reasonable or proportionate response of possibility of success where reasonable and proportionate are related in part to the size of the stakes of what is being righted or reversed is of great importance. A smaller chance of success can seem justified compared to the likely costs and violence and death and so forth. That, in cases where the amount of violence is smaller, where the possible losses are small compared to the rewards where in cases where the possible losses are high and the possible benefits rather low, one would say that only a fairly high chance of success is reasonable. One can't make a judgment of small or high that is unrelated to the stakes in terms of odds but 1 percent may be, well 90 percent would normally be regarded as a high chance of success under saying that depending on the stakes there would be times in which one would say that was not at all a reasonable chance of success under the circumstances.

Michael was very impressed by the, I think it's called the Farthingale or Martingale strategy in roulette which might give you, if you were prepared to bet three times to double three times a seven-eighth chance of winning. And he was rather oblivious to the point that the one-eighth chance of losing is a chance of losing eight times or four times the stake. Now if the losses went up even higher than that, even more than doubling, when one doubled one's chance of success or if one halved one's chance of loss but the potential loss went up even greater, that would make the Martingale look even worse.

So it shifts the burden of uncertainty, it shifts the burden of first use of violence and why this first use? Because violence is understood to evoke violence, to make it necessary, legitimate and psychologically likely. In other words a likely response for reasons that go beyond right, legitimacy or effectiveness but have a causal impact directly through its effect on the psychology of the victim or the responder including his sense of humiliation, injury to male pride and obligation of defenders, obligation of authorities, obligation of patriots, patriotic citizens, of people in a military scheme of authority, command and of males, in particular male defenders of territory, of women, of property. It invokes obligations, it invokes military responses.

Yet another dimension. The fait accompli like the coup d'etat or the surprise attack aims to change, not just to coerce,

to induce a response from those people, systems who control a region and who exercise authority over that region or over certain resources. But to change effectively those who control that region, it attempts to change the effective controllers of a region in order to induce a response or to coerce, to bribe, to threaten, to achieve a response from those who control another region, a neighboring region or a surrounding region or a region that used to exercise offensive, effective authority over that region but no longer does so. The first point then is to change those who exercise effective control whether that control is achieved by coercive means or authoritative means or by what is thought of as direct physical control, an alternative way of looking at the situation or a way of affecting it. Those who can physically (who have the means) do so as opposed to those who can get someone else to do so by various means.

Effective control is an ingredient of authority. It's a necessary but not sufficient aspect of authority or a condition or definition of authority. This effective control has to be accepted as legitimate and empirically as effective control is exercised over a period of time it acquires some legitimacy because it's generally regarded that any effective controller is better or may be better, unless it acts very, very egregiously, incompetently or brutally or selfishly, as a better situation than a lack of control or chaotic, an undirected, uncontrolled situation. So that anyone who can exercise effective control is seen as doing so to some degree in the interests of all and as better than an uncertain situation in which the outcome would be or might well be, would likely to be a lack of control or direction as in a traffic situation in which there is destruction and chaos, purposes could not be achieved at all. There would be no certainty.

So we have all the things in contributing to authority, what is initially illegitimate power, acquires a sense of mutual consent or legitimacy. People begin to adapt and adjust to it. One ingredient then in authority or a stepping-stone toward authority, or situations which one's commands are obeyed because automatically without question, without calculation, without resistance and with the mettle of men because they're seen as right to be obeyed. It is their right. It's correct to obey them. This is, in the first instance, simply the ability to get compliance without necessarily the mantle of right or legitimacy or tradition or lineage, having been designated by authority or having inherited, in some sense, this from previous authority, delegation.

This effective control may come from having displaced those people who previously control the instruments of communication, the radio stations, newspapers, the places from which edicts emerge, the poster wall; either by killing them, bribing them, moving while they were absent from their posts, occupying those

posts while they were absent, while they were sleeping or distracted, or they were elsewhere. This control may come of course from killing them or inducing them to comply, making them instruments of your new power as when broadcasters in Moscow are subject to varying influences, familiar broadcasters or just the people who are present in the studio reading the news.

An aim of all this of course is to get obedient compliance, in part because the new controllers of the territory are seen as authoritative and thus to get advantage of the Milgrim response in which obedience to authority, keeping in mind that the response also may have contracts but let's say there's no element of prior agreement here, of contract, and where the authority may come simply from, largely from being the effective people or body in control.

The idea would be to paralyze the response long enough so that gradually these become seen as having the mantle of a certain amount of tradition and past compliance, previous days, get the advantage of habits, building up of compliance, of coordination, of participation, of collaboration. One way is simply by displacing the instruments of authority; the police forces, previous ones or getting them to collaborate, killing them or getting them to collaborate, replacing them by a new one. You see this in Panama where, on the one hand, the National Guard who are also the police force are killed, captured, confined to barracks, displaced by new authorities, new controllers, new police force, that is the American army. So gradually the American army can be removed. Many elements of the old police are put back but now subject to new controllers themselves, not all so new either.

In Iraq the Americans showed actually that they prefer the old instruments of authority, namely the Iraqi army, even potentially the Republican Guard but at any rate the other parts of the army, to new instruments of control who would be responsive to different leaders with different values such as the Kurds or the Shiites, the latter potentially subject to the influence of the Iranians. Although, in fact, this seems not to be the case but there is a fear they would also incite similar rebellions in Saudi Arabia. The Kurds might incite similar rebellions merely by their example in Turkey thus affecting the central authority of the people in control respectively in Turkey or in Saudi Arabia. They would undermine the authority over their whole territories, their whole power holding position, their right to exercise power even in other areas and most immediately would remove their control and authority from the border areas immediately affected in Saudi Arabia or in Turkey.

Thus, whereas Acheson talked to the bad apple infecting the whole barrel of apples, the good apples. Here you have the

dangerous situation of a good, that is self-determining, democratic, potentially non-oppressive; a good apple potentially affecting a bunch of bad apples which are our bad apples. He's a bad apple but he's our bad apple. This is in the case of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Samozia, etc., and what Chomsky calls, - the danger of a good example.

What's in the back of my mind throughout this discussion is the German occupation of Denmark where the people simply wake up one morning to find, in effect, German troops in their city as in Czechoslovakia in '68 having displaced or supplanted or overwhelmed the local police so that in effect the effective authority now, the ability to control then comes from the ability to coerce, the ability to threaten, the ability to exert violence over this area or direct muscular activity.

The contrast between the violence or direct physical control often has to do with whose will in whose head is controlling certain muscular activity. It's the difference between the kind of control that the brain exerts over muscles or the sympathetic nervous system controls over muscles within one skin, within one body as opposed to affects that are mediated through the brain or sympathetic nervous system of another body. In some cases of course one grabs the other person's body or limbs and their movement is not in fact mediated by their brain. This is rarely spelled out so that the movement of the other person's arm as it's being twisted behind their back, let's say, is not a voluntary movement or an involuntary movement caused by their sympathetic nervous system but is involuntary in response to the perpetrators, to the policemen's nervous system as is the perpetrators own arms being picked up, twisted, doubled over, pushed by a force outside their body and a force which is controlled not by their brain but by someone else's brain.

The key point here is that one's own controlling elements, alerting elements and reacting elements are not present or on duty at all times or alert at all times. They sleep, they're away, there are weak points, there are vulnerabilities in holidays as in Tet Offensive or Yom Kippur wars in which they are simply not in position, not there and they are subject then to being displaced non-violently or with very low violence, the low meaning, a few elements may be subject to violence or threat.

Now, to come back to a much earlier thought. Violence is understood to lead to violence by an often non rational process even when a rational calculation would show that a violent response is unjustified or is inappropriate in the sense that it is extremely unpromising, that it has no reasonable chance of succeeding. It may happen anyway as a kind of reflex because of these obligations, deterrent threats, command authorities or because of injured pride, especially injured male pride which is

programmed to lead, educated, prepared and which does evoke a violent response because that violent response is programmed and because the violence is seen as appropriate even when its consequences are mutually destructive. In effect, one's values, rash of values from which one basis calculations are changed so that one's focus is upon causing destruction to the violence.

The important, overriding priority is to cause violence and harm, injury, humiliation, destruction, death to the perpetrator even at the cost of great risk or death to oneself as in the movie - "Boyz N The Hood" last night, a movie after all largely about male pride, machismo, honor, violence, where the violent death of his friend, his brother causes Trey Stiles to join a group seeking violence in revenge even against the almost overriding authority of his father who first tries coercively and then by putting him in his room, almost physically, to prevent him from doing this as well as using his full authority and his identification. Trey nevertheless escapes from the window and joins the other group who go off and commit violence. But then in the course of it, since it takes time, realizes that this violence is so against his own interests, that he acts rationally and accepts the authority of his father and even at the cost of appearing cowardly and indecisive, changing his mind, leaves the car and goes back home, saves his life, saves him from further revenge by others where his friend who does commit the counter violence is himself killed a couple of weeks later.

[END OF SIDE 1]. [JULY 16TH - SIDE 2 OF "FAIT ACCOMPLI"].

Violence is understood to cause a cycle of violence, to cause a violent reaction even when the violent reaction is itself not rational in the sense that it's future consequences are more bad than good, more bad than the perpetrator, very dangerous. It supplants, in effect, rational calculation though from another point of view, in part, it changes the basis of rational calculation. It changes what is the values and what is appropriate. It focuses, it creates values which economists tend to regard as non rational in their essence and one of the rare times when they actually judge preferences or judge value in that it creates a desire for harming the other party even at the cost of one's own physical harm or even one's own physical overwhelming harm, perhaps death, death of other loved ones, irreversible injury. But that which, to the economist, tends to be regarded as the highest values are supplanted by a desire to harm the other person and a focus and intention on harming the other person as a consequence as opposed to long run consequences, consequences to innocent bystanders or to oneself or to raise a dimension not normally considered by economists, harm to the rights of various people. It causes you to do things that are not legitimate, that are against the law, that are immoral, in the interest of an overriding desire to cause harm to another person, specifically physical harm in some cases or harm comparable to what that person has cost. In other words a

revenge, a vindication, an equalizing, a restoring of status and of dignity and of honor in the interest generally of restoring a status, even at least in people's memory so that you will be remembered as having been honorable and of equal status.

So that even after you are dead affecting, in this sense, a consequence that is sought is a description or an attitude towards oneself in history books. Presidents are thought of, concerned about this because they have a, normally are accorded a traditional place in history books where an ordinary person would not expect to be in the books at all; that is not a consideration. Or if it's not the history books, it's the obituary, it's the brief mention in newspapers and thus presumably eventually in the minds you are trying to affect an image of oneself, a memory or an impression in the minds of other people who survive one or successive generations. Presidents are especially prone to this because they have, not an assurance but a likelihood of some mention in the history books since history is written as the account of heroes, of great men, generally men, holders of power or authority in a continuous chain.

History is divided into periods which are marked by the holder of effective power or authority over a region whose history is being recounted. This holder is regarded as so important that continuity is achieved in the telling of the story by not omitting, by marking periods, even periods of little consequence with respect to the holder of authority during that period, not of day or night or weather or geography. And history is also winners. History is when one has won that position, that limited or partial victory is enough to get you into the history books. But how will you be presented in the history books? That is a concern to these power holders to some extent comparable to the desire of people of lesser authority or no authority to be regarded in a certain way or regarded well by their children or by their friends who succeed them, the world at large as a person of honor and that can supersede the desire for additional days of life, of enjoyment of life. It can lead a person take a risk of death or even the certainty of death or of terrible injury that would preclude the enjoyment of life or the full enjoyment. But you will still have acted in the image.

Part of what you seek to effect then contrary to an economist's usual assumptions, it's not simply physical pleasure experienced by your own physical situation or even the psychological pleasure of self esteem or of knowing that you have acted in a certain way but the attitudes, feelings, images, in the minds of others. One tries to affect and not only for one's own enjoyment, but just as a goal. All activity is to be a man of honor.

Now I still haven't touched on the fait accompli in the sense of its actual name, of changing the frame, the story of what is given, whether something is to be changed, keeping in

mind the Kahneman-Tversky notion that one's reaction to a situation very much depends on where the status quo is seen, where the zero is, whether it is seen as a gain or a loss from a given situation. Whether one's actions aim at a change or preserving the status quo or restoring the status quo, the way in which one perceives risks and one's willingness to accept risks, one's evaluation of risks, the Neuman-Morgenstern utility function in effect, is very much affected by one's frame and by the zero point, how it is seen with respect to a status quo, whether it's seen as a change to a new situation, a restoration of an old situation, or a prevention of change.

I'm not sure they have the category of prevention of change but they could. Thus a sense of what the risks are and also ones evaluation of it depends on this frame. The fait accompli aims to affect the zero point, the status quo, to shift it, to displace it in such a way as to reframe the situation so that one's choices are seen in a new light with respect to a different status quo so much of the decisions under it, certainly experiments of Kahneman-Tversky and Slovic and Lichtenstein and the others are related to this, the aims of the fait accompli which aim to change this frame. Also, the accomplished fact, it has a temporal aspect. It is to change what is given in the situation in relations to one's perception of what is an option.

[NEW SECTION].

To achieve the fait accompli as to achieve a coup d'etat or to achieve a surprise attack requires great and unusual, surprising, extraordinary, out of the ordinary speed. Why surprising or extraordinary? Because if it were expected, if it were understood that the speed was possible, defenses would have attempted at least to adjust to that fact, to change the speed of response or the amount of time during which defensive forces were unalert, or unavailable, the speed with which they could react. So unless one manages to surprise that one is likely to encounter defenses that can react adequately in time or are in place. The aim then must be to achieve a kind of speed which was thought to be too expensive or unattainable.

[FOOTNOTE]

Notice the surprise of our Intelligence which the Iraqis did achieve with respect to their nuclear program. It was thought that they would be using methods that would require from where they were known to be, five to ten years to acquire a nuclear weapon. They were using the surprising approach which, in itself, was costly of electrical power but they had plenty of electrical power. I'd have to know more about this but I take it, it is from some respects, very slow but in other respects, it's hard to observe the processes are small, physically small, don't require a great deal of capital or large plants. So they have

particular advantages but in particular can't be observed and are unlikely to be looked for. They weren't looked for and are hard to look for anyway. In the future they will be looked for but they will still be hard to observe. But they weren't looked for precisely because they were thought to be too expensive, overlooking the point that approaches that were less expensive were however easier to observe and thus they were thought to be five or ten years away. They were actually able to get pretty close. They have the materials right now after all for a nuclear weapon. Surprise was achieved.

That suggests that others may be in the process of producing a comparable surprise. The Iraqis may not have been the only ones who thought of this approach since it's not, after all, dumb in the sense of being inefficient in terms of energy, electrical power but very clever in evading adversarial responses. Dumb for Robinson Carusoe, smart for an adversary, a weaker adversary subject to attack. They could well have presented us with a fait accompli in the sense of the possession of a nuclear weapon that was thought to be out of their physical capability and some five or ten years away. They have been working on this for some time.

[END FOOTNOTE].

The speed requires coordination to a degree that may be thought to be unattainable in terms of discipline, training, the ability to act as a unit together. The actor may not be thought of as having the communications capability to do that or the central planning capability. It requires planning, perhaps training and exercise to achieve this smooth and coordinated effect. Why? Because the speed required may be the speed of the slowest element, the slowest link. Everything must be accomplished within a certain period of time or the other side will be sufficiently alerted to move its elements into position. If anything acts too fast, too soon or too slowly the other side will, in effect, mobilize, alert its defenses. So you have to surprise it.

Remember that the premise, what makes this all possible is that the other side's defenses, its abilities to deter or physically to prevent or to destroy certain aggressive moves against it, are not, in fact, continuously in place or continuously effective as the citizenry tends to believe. They think that where great expense has been made and where great promises have been made of defense, that that defense is minimally adequate or continuously effective at all moments, day or night, over holidays, all the time like a wall in place. Whereas in fact the system of defense may have a wall in it but where the wall must be manned, must be surveilled and where that human element is not continuously on duty so that in fact as the aggressor may know but the citizenry at large does not

understand, there are moments and periods when there is no effective defense.

And if one can get inside the walls, can move faster than the defenses can be activated and put into effect, then it's as if they did not exist or had never existed. This may require then great coordination. Coordination that one is not regarded as having the capability to do. Thus the Viet Cong moved from isolated actions, where they were not thought to have their radio or courier communications or even the strength in place that would allow simultaneous actions in various places. It was thought they would have to bring their forces together for an action in a particular place. Rather it was found, they not only had much greater forces all over the country than were regarded, so they could do many simultaneous actions physically but they could coordinate those actions and catch defenses down simultaneously throughout the country or on a holiday when all the defenses were down all at once and at night time.

As for example, interesting with all the talk of Yom Kippur and Tet as being illegitimate attacks during religious holiday, we tend to forget Washington's famous move on Christmas Eve against the Hessians. A time when the attacker is expected, not only to observe out of respect for the others' religious traditions, as a kind of unwritten rule or law but to be observing his own, the same religious tradition both from his own mores, his own religious obligations and his desire for relaxation for a holiday for enjoyment, for getting drunk, taking time off from work. It wasn't thought that Vietnamese of either side would forego their enjoyment of their Tet holiday by attacking during that.

The major point here is the defenses are discontinuous, episodic. The human elements require rest, time off. Or the cost of continuity is too great. The electrical power, the energy, so often they're switched off to save energy, be less costly or perhaps less dangerous, less prone to false alarm and thus a generally weaker enemy. An enemy that cannot mount defenses or offenses as continuously or on as great scale ever as the other. Nevertheless, the effects can be that it has an offensive capability and the other is as if it had no defense at all at certain moments. If men can act during that moment, they can get through the defenses. It's like having a weak point in fortifications, can be burrowed through or smashed through rather easily. This is a weak point temporally, there are moments, there are times when one can get through when the other, in effect, just doesn't exist.

Now, inevitably inflicting this kind of defeat on the other is humiliating to the other's authorities, precisely because of the public's belief that such an event should be impossible, their belief that the defense that has been purchased is

continuous or cannot simply be circumvented, is not simply incompetent and the surprising revelation that an opponent can get through, surmount his defenses as if they had never existed, is a humiliating defeat for the authority. It's embarrassing. It shows them to have been incompetent, to have failed in their promises or their assurances, their claims that something had been achieved or that they knew how to do something, that they were the appropriate rulers and fulfilled their obligations. So that humiliation in turn evokes a desire for counter humiliation, for revenge, perhaps for violence just as violence does. These are two different motivations for fast action, violent, illegitimate, risky action.

By the fait accompli or like the coup d'etat, which, on one hand, is an alternative to violence and in that sense does not evoke a violent response, may by its humiliating effect, embarrassing effect, evoke violence or desperate action or change the frame of values in such a way as indeed to evoke an action, even one that does not, after all, appear likely to succeed and would ordinarily be as true because it doesn't have reasonable chances of succeeding, of improving one's own benefits, pleasures. But, nevertheless, the action may be chosen because it will punish or restore the other, or restore a sense of honor, an obligation or merely by reflex, by habit, in short a non rational response.

In terms then of speed and coordination, one thing that must be coordinated is the radio discipline, keeping large numbers of related elements from using radio in a normal way or telephone in a way that can be picked up by the other side. This may have a surprising quality. The other side may not be thought of as having even the discipline or the coordination to achieve that silence. This was true in the movement of missiles in the Soviet Union to the ports and from the ports to Cuba. It was done by me in the movement of Pentagon Papers where we stayed off the telephone.

One wonders what happened with Hitler and his surprise attack on Russia and did Russia really fail to have electronic communications. I've never, by the way, seen any account of what Russia's capabilities were for communications intercept and how they managed to be so surprised. What about, for that matter, the French? How about a history of Second World War in terms of Special Intelligence, in terms of communications intelligence. What has leaked out is the enigma aspect, the ability of the allies to intercept and to decode German communications. But, what about the reverse? And what about French and Soviet and other forms of intelligence? And what about the sharing of that intelligence? How as Hitler able to surprise not only individual enemies in a surprise attack but their allies? Did the allies fail to pick up or warn, whether in cases where certain allies did have warning and allegedly Churchill, for example, did warn

Stalin, his great enemy, of impending attack but that Stalin ignored this warning.

Now, there is new statements by Soviet defectors, or Soviets in place that in fact the Nazis were pre-empting an attack by the Soviet Union although that certainly goes against everything I've heard before about Stalin's desire to preserve the collaboration with Hitler as long as possible. I just saw somewhere this story that the Soviet attack was just two weeks off. That seems somehow unlikely because the Nazi attack, in turn, required a very lengthy preparation and was an ultimate goal of Hitler. It seems unlikely that it was mainly preemptive. Although I think Patrick Buchanan referred to that in a recent column, in his usual tradition of apologizing for or supporting Nazi moves, perhaps in his Irish Catholic sympathies with any moves against the British and against the Russians, the Communists.

Accomplished fact, fait accompli. What is a fact that is a given, a physical aspect to the situation, an authoritatively given aspect to the situation, not to be changed. A situation that defines the problem, that is not part of the problem which is a part to be changed but rather is taken as given, as in the expression, - Rusk is used to hearing from his old military boss, Marshall, - Don't fight the problem. Take the problem as I, the authority, give it. These are the givens of the problem. These are your goals. These are your instruments. Your problem is simply how to use the instruments in the pursuit of the given goals, which to choose, how to implement the program.

The aim is to induce compliance. The aim of the fait accompli is to induce compliance and collaboration in the same way that the aim of blackmail or threat is to induce compliance, to affect the nervous system of the other in such a way as to induce desired behavior, to make the desires of the victim, of the other party compatible with one's own desires though earlier they would have desired differently, they would have desired that this not happen, the situation work out differently. But now you want to induce them to refrain from acting against it, as a choice; a conscious calculated choice or as a habit or in some cases, you want them to act, to accept your authority, to collaborate actively in accordance with one's own desires rather than against one's desires or wishes or interests.

Notice that assassination may often be a part of these plans of actually displacing a particular authority, controller, sometimes as a sheer act of revenge as in the case of Noriega or Saddam, punishment for insufficient deference, punishment for embarrassing, humiliating, defying one, hurting one's pride, honor, authority, self esteem or it may be because that particular ruler, and thus this punishment is an example to

others and a vindication of one's own pride, in the eyes of one's own domestic rivals and public, so that one keeps one's job by displacing this other person from his life or job. That is almost the only thing wanted in the case of Sadaam, his humiliation or death, no other change in the situation, no dismemberment to Iraq. Though also it was desired to reduce but not to eliminate his offensive capabilities, but supposedly not his defensive capabilities against foreign enemies or, it turns out, against domestic rivals who wanted self determination, democracy or dismemberment of Iraq or a share in power; where their claims were legitimate but against our interests because they hurt the interests of other illegitimate authorities on their borders.

Likewise in Panama, it would seem the only change we wanted was to displace Noriega in revenge, a previous ally; not to displace the National Guard. When Carter desired Samozza to leave, he wanted him to leave before the National Guard was destroyed so that a figure aligned with the National Guard could remain in power with the help of the National Guard. Likewise, we could have aimed to displace Thieu by say Big Minh and get a collaboration in which the ARVN like the National Guard would have remained intact and thus to win then a place in power, a significant place in power vis-a-vis the communists. But in that case, partly because of the onus of having displaced Diem earlier, we chose not to act in that pattern, to do what the Democrats were accused of having done and having been illegitimate in doing it, to displace, so that proposals to displace Thieu in part were eschewed for that reason and in part because it was thought that it really wasn't necessary that they could do better than share power over Saigon. They could continue to control Saigon.

At any rate, part then of paralyzing the response may be to paralyze the recognized leader and thus confuse, to displace, to remove an element of authority so that responses would not be Milgram like, would not be obedient and therefore would not be coordinated adequately or quick enough. You wouldn't get the quick response to authority but people would have to act on their own in uncoordinated fashion and thus less promise of effectiveness. The other reason is not only to kill Saddam but even though the desire was not destroy the Baath Party or military control, the idea was to slow its response to our attack effectively by blinding it, hitting communications and warning systems but also by hitting command posts, getting not all the commanders but those that were on duty at that time, for a limited time, destroying their ability to coordinate and to command, likewise in Panama.

I wonder if Suez was not accompanied with an assassination attempt. And if so, why not, of Nasser, since the aim was definitely the humiliation and thus the overthrow of Nasser. The

aim was very comparable to that of the attack on Iraq. Again, the British and French were involved but this time with the United States in an area of their previous hegemony which they had been joined by the United States. And, of course, this time with the at least tacit collaboration of the Russians as well, although not possible to achieve their active collaboration. The Russians were paralyzed by bribery, by a new system, by coercion as were the Chinese, as was the UN. In Suez the fait accompli was very importantly a fait malaccompli where they were right in thinking that Eisenhower preferred to be confronted with a fait accompli then to have to respond, to be challenged to respond in the interests of world order against aggression, UN Charter, anti-imperialism and even the incentive of having been fooled, of reacting to vindicate that, he still would have been preferred once they had done it, a very fast action. And that was in part foiled by their inability to act fast enough. In part they delayed too long before invading. They bombed too long and took too long for their forces to move from Cyprus to Suez. So that in the event their forces were surprisingly halted in the midst of their course down the Suez Canal.

Thus the party undertaking the fait accompli has to have and exhibit, a surprising, unexpected, unforeseen amount of ability to coordinate attack, to move everything at once. All of the activities which were perhaps normally done in a sequence of steps with alerting followed by various preparing activities, to have the visible parts of these all done, all occur at once so that in a very short space of time, instead of sequence of steps, one gets a simultaneous set of moves, so that you don't have one of them giving warning in a way so the defender is able to preclude the other steps or the later steps, there are no later steps, because they're all done simultaneously. And the overall time necessary for this number of activities is very compressed into the period in which one is on alert. My earlier description augers very heavily simply on the role of deception because that has an inadvertent effect of motivating the other side or inducing to react fast or violently, aggressively or actually causing such a response, almost by reflex, by habit, obligation as distinct from calculation or motivation in terms of consequences.

But what I'm saying now is there is so many other aspects than those that call for deception which have to do with causing speed of effect, of overall effectiveness. Remember the Japanese ability to achieve surprise by, in part, their silence and their lies and their silence in the negotiations, their misleading discussion of further negotiations in Washington was a major part of it along with extending the range of the Zero, the various things Roberta Wohlstetter talks about, which are probably worth looking at again. It certainly had an effect on my own thinking back in '58. I had already studied surprise moves by Hitler in the thirties in early '58 I believe before I read her book. I

then read her book which was then a manuscript, probably in the summer of '58, '59 or was it when I first arrived? '59, '60.

I should look up Edward Lutwak's book on coup d'etat and Richard Betts on surprise attack. Of course the coordination exhibited in its surprisingness, in the discipline and competence, the silence; all have this humiliating effect as in the Tet Offensive and its effect on Lyndon Johnson in, not only making him look, him and Westmoreland and the others look foolish in their assurances and their predictions and incompetent and the future prospects look unpromising but made him literally look incredible as though his future assurances simply could not be believed either because he was lying or because he didn't know. Thus he lost authority, was challenged within his own party by a rival - in particular Bobbie Kennedy - this having been his major fear from the beginning.

In contrast to say Mort Halperin's view, a cynical view of Bobbie Kennedy as simply self serving, Bobbie was not all. It would be quite wrong to say that Bobbie was willing to attack him equally, indifferently on the grounds that he had not prosecuted the war effectively or competently or violently enough or cleverly or the grounds that the war should be ended. By that time I have no question at all in my mind that Bobbie choose to confront him on the grounds that the war should be ended for reasons that were not purely self serving. He hated to win actually, the real voting for McCarthy indicated, at least as much support and probably more support for a more effective, violent prosecution of the war as for ending the war and Mort is leaving that out of the account. And, although that was not fully understood by everyone in the first reaction to McCarthy, it was understood by pollsters even before that situation, Johnson, himself, knew that there was pressure on him, that his own interests lying presenting himself as someone who is ready to prosecute the war with the gloves off, in a more violent dangerous fashion. Bobbie, by his earlier hawk instincts, would certainly have been capable of pressing that point but by '67, I'm convinced, would not at all have sought to displace Johnson on those grounds. He chose the same grounds as McCarthy.

[END OF SIDE 2].

[SIDE 3, JULY 16, '91]. [THEORY OF FAIT ACCOMPLI BLACKMAIL].

The starting point of these thoughts was last night's perception in looking at old notes from my Irvine lecture number 4, 6, that there was a correspondence between the fait accompli and blackmail. They went together, in part, by having similar ends, purposes and in part because one was likely to be a part of the other. The fait accompli may well incorporate some aspects of blackmail threats of some elements of the other's defenses. An effective blackmail in turn may require certain aspects of a

fait accompli. The third correspondence is that the basic goal of fait accompli is to achieve an eventual state of compliance or collaboration based on both rational calculation, as in the blackmail case, of coercion and in some contrast to literal blackmail, to achieve a habitual response of obedience to authority by, in effect, changing the authority in a given situation.

But in the larger sense, where one does not actually change the authorities of the people in control, one wants to affect their rational calculations as does blackmail by changing under their noses the givens, the premises of action by changing the, - quote "bygones" as in - let bygones be bygones. So that action oriented toward future consequences, reaction looks hopeless or excessively costly and specifically violent reaction. Why does one aim to prevent or preclude a violent response or indeed any response against one's own aggressive interests? Partly because even if one could win that violent contest with high assurance, it would nevertheless be, to some extent, costly and painful to oneself. Even the weaker party may be able to affect some damage and destruction which is not an ordinary cost, it would involve killing people or irreversible destruction. It is also because violence is, by its nature, somewhat uncertain. It may trigger in oneself, violent responses which are non-rational and which go beyond cost effective calculations.

I don't want a violent contest to get started because it may be bad for both sides, including oneself, and, indeed because you destroy the other party to a degree that is seen as illegitimate, undesirable and third parties as well. So you want to eschew violence yourself and in part you do that because your aim is to preclude violence on the other person's side. You want to prevent him from starting a violent process as well. And thus the fait accompli has the same tactical or operational goal as blackmail which is to achieve one's ends without either using violence directly or evoking violence. Violence, if you used it, would probably evoke counter violence but you don't want at all to evoke violence. And here is where either blackmail or in particular the fait accompli may be counter productive in that, by a different route, it does nevertheless cause a violent reaction by inducing a sense of humiliation. That may be especially true of the fait accompli.

The blackmails, may dampen that response because the entire operation may be secret so that the opponent's public image is not actually affected. In fact he's acting in order to prevent a change in his public image. And by that token, may be less induced to retaliate violently even though his interests have been secretly affected. His assets have been brought down, he's had to transfer, to use certain assets. Though that very thing may cause a desire for revenge and humiliation but if it's effective, if it's successful, it doesn't. One of the elements

of success to preclude any reaction at all and certainly any violent reaction, likewise, for the fait accompli. The coup de main, as opposed to coup d'etat or surprise attack is often intended not to preclude any response or perhaps in the end, a very major one, but to delay it and to greatly reduce the overall costs or danger or violence of the operation by delaying, paralyzing an immediate response.

Notice that the fait accompli of Pearl Harbor has, in a review I just picked up last night, was intended above all to win six months of time to keep the U.S. from reacting effectively during which the Japanese could consolidate their gains in the Far East, building up defenses and achieving a kind of authority and new de facto rulership of those governments, those areas, having displaced the colonial rulers, the British and French. Thus, their aim was to confront the U.S. with a fait accompli in which, by the way, the legitimacy the Japanese rule would be seen as not less than the legitimacy of the previous British and French rule. The problem here being though, that the tactics used to achieve the fait accompli, namely, a coup de main or surprise attack, was seen as so treacherous as to affect our values in what was legitimate and our need for revenge, not merely for restoration of a status quo which, from our point of view, wasn't that decisively changed from previous colonial status quo in the Far East. But this had been done in a way that offensive to us, humiliating to us, and called for a violent response.

The Japanese did, achieve an almost total, cleanness of their attack, no collateral damage, very, very little civilian death as in the Terminator scene the other day, the Terminator is able to drive by his firing police from their positions without killing anyone or in other cases he wounded them without actually killing anyone. So the Japanese, to an amazing degree, managed to avoid civilian casualties. But that still was not enough because the wound to American pride was enough to enable Roosevelt to mobilize support for a full scale war, including a war against Hitler, which, in turn, was very unpromising and did not have the full allegiance of German Americans or Irish, anti-British, or it would seem the Scandinavian Americans. This not clear to me but perhaps had to do with Lutheran affinities with the Germans.

Pearl Harbor is the perfect example of a surprise attack in service of a fait accompli but where the fait accompli was thwarted, made a fait malaccompli, by the changed values, the changed response due to two factors, both the violence and aggressiveness of their attack on our forces, not just threat and the deception that was involved, the treachery of it, the fact that surprise was achieved while assurances were being given or negotiations were being conducted in Washington and a clear attempt had been made to surprise us. In that sense, the

placement of the missiles in Cuba was seen as a kind of Pearl Harbor, possibly in a preparation for a literal Pearl Harbor, in which there would be nuclear first strike.

This was an association encouraged by the Administration, very deceptively, in fact one could say as deceptively as the Russians did deceiving our own public by the thought that we believed, whether it made sense, that the Soviets were preparing for a surprise attack that was virtually a total illusion since the threat they were making, even as a threat and essentially as a bluff, but the realistic threat was the threat of loss of control by central authority but under attack. The more explicit threat was the threat of response to an American attack and thus not a surprise attack, possible a first strike, a threat of a first strike, but that, in turn, almost certainly a bluff because of our capability to retaliate. But even had it been a first strike, it would not have been a surprise first strike because they would have presumably found U.S. forces in a very alerted position. The premise was U.S. attack on Cuba.

Why is the fait accompli not used all the time or why is it not always the method of choice? Partly it is itself particularly vulnerable to being thwarted and thus in a humiliating fashion and costly fashion, if it does not achieve sufficient surprise because in order to achieve surprise, it is done, often with minimal forces, so as not to give warning. And thus is particularly vulnerable. It may also involve use of roots or measures which are inherently vulnerable and for that reason are not considered as approaches and are apt to find the opponent un alert, and unprepared prepared, precisely because they are in dangerous and vulnerable or of marginal effectiveness.

If the surprise then is not achieved, if deception is not effective or if warning is given by some premature or too slow, by some measures which move for others, prematurely or other measures which act too slowly, there is the notion of not being either too fast in some elements, that is acting too soon. On the other hand, achieving their goal too slowly, too late, emphasizes the need for coordination of all elements, everything must be done precisely on time. That calls for an ability to coordinate, plan and perhaps train, discipline, which may be beyond ordinary capabilities or beyond the capabilities of a particular opponent. It's a very complex operation in its need for coordination, for simultaneity and for perhaps extraordinary performance, not just by one element but by a whole series of elements at the same time and thus having the likelihood of failing in its complexity and its call for extraordinary performance. It may, in other words, simply be beyond the capability of even a very strong state which however lacks capabilities for extreme coordination, perhaps its communication capabilities are not up to the strength of its elements.

This was a problem of the czars armies in World War I. It was capable of reacting only relatively slowly compared to Germany partly because of its communications problems, its transportation problems. Germany, they were relying on a very speedy attack, and also had planned a surprising line of attack, surprising precisely, in part because, in part it involved illegal activities, bringing a third party, namely Belgium, perhaps Holland, Belgium anyway, under attack, though neutral and Hitler was counting there again as later learned, by coercion, by threat, by blackmail, on gaining the compliance of Belgium and perhaps Dutch authorities and using their territory, thus harnessing blackmail to the accomplishment of a surprise attack. Again, the attack was to be surprising in part because it was so unbalanced and therefore vulnerable. If foreseen, it was susceptible to being countered by an attack on the hinge.

The M Plan, there the essence was both speed and massing. But the Germans then countered on, in effect, putting the French out of the war with the fast, very speedy, amazingly speedy defeat and then be able to wheel across Germany and confront the Russians who reacted more slowly, thus defeating the opponents separately, preventing their coordinated attack and simultaneous attack. Likewise, the account that the Brookings' expert, Mc. somebody, saw that the Russians wanted a fait accompli or a surprise attack of expelling U.S. forces, allied forces from the continent of Europe before they could decide to use nuclear weapons and thus putting the onus of invasion and perhaps as well first use on the U.S. and assuring the destruction of West Europe in the process.

In terms of the uncertainties and dangers of a violent process, one sees, on the one hand, the actual decision by Saddam Hussein to blow the oil wells, a decision which to this day is not fully clear as to why he did that, although he had threatened to do it, but why he carried out that threat. One possible reason that he was very worried about amphibious landing and felt that that would physically impede the capability for amphibious landing which was in fact just a bluff in Schwarzkopf's eyes. The other that it was a bringing down the temple reaction, Samson reaction. But that goes against his refraining from using chemical warfare, his discipline in doing that indicates that he was not purely interested in suicide or mutual destruction but was attempting to cut his losses. So why then did he fire the oil wells? Perhaps a punishment of Kuwait which had defied him in the first place. A lot of his actions showed real vengeance against Kuwait in having refused his demands for cutting his debt and for giving him money and their provocative behavior in siphoning oil from Rumalia oil field perhaps with the encouragement of the US.

In the larger picture notice the review of the Beschluss

book which quotes a letter from Jackie Kennedy to Khrushchev after the event, which says the two of them were united in their desire to avoid nuclear war. That is probably true in their conscious feelings and it's true of them relative to other leaders of both countries. They were ready to take their predisposition for given ends was to; they were less willing by many standards to risk nuclear war than were their predecessors or successors and yet when one confronts the paradox that they did in fact pose each other greater risks than their successors or predecessors. They brought the risks to their highest pitch. Is this to be explained only by mutual interaction? Even that begs the question a bit because why did each provoke the other in this way? Was it not, since they really did not want either the other to run the risk of nuclear war, they did not want to do it themselves. How did they come to revoke each other into this interaction and causing these risks? The answer would seem to be that they did not fully foresee the consequences of their actions on the other. What consequences did they fail to foresee?

Jackie goes on to say that great men act with wisdom and prudence but lesser men react out of fear and pride. Surely the moral is of the Cuban Missile Crisis, that all men, great men including these particular men, even men who have an unusual reluctance to use nuclear forces in some circumstance, nuclear threats, nevertheless, take these risks of nuclear action in response to pride and fear, very specifically pride, just as do men she regards as lesser men, it's not only lesser men. Moreover, it is not only the lesser men in the sense of subordinates who take risky actions but it is the possibility of their leaders doing it. One wonders, who wrote that letter. Was it Jackie or was it as often Sorenson wrote that for Jackie after her husband's death?

NOTE: In the Godfather movies how often things are done: A, as a fait accompli and B, with the hope and some expectation that the subordinates of the assassinated head of a rival gang or sub-gang will accept the new situation, will accept one's new authority, will show allegiance even, not only cooperate but actually obey or join part of the gang. Your boss is dead, that's the situation, - too bad about that. It had to happen. It was only business. It wasn't personal. Now work for me. I can use a man like you, with apparently some assurance that this is possible.

This aims to work both on the rational calculations, the greed, self interest of the former subordinates of the assassinated leader and also to induce new feelings of loyalty, to benefit from habitual responses to the fact that since the murderous leader who has just killed the other, his rival, is now in effective control, in authority and is the new boss to be respected, not merely complied with. Again, the analogy of the international system, on the one hand, and domestic leadership on the other, precisely to the analogy of the Mafia is very

relevant. The Godfather movies or the gangster, the Mafia type movies are particularly relevant both to international affairs and to a surprising degree to democratic leadership in the actual United States or elsewhere.

Draper describe North as having an essentially feudal fealty to his superiors though that in fact is rather questionable given his willingness to turn on them once he was he himself charged. Oddly in contradiction to Draper's point. Liddy however did have that Nazi like obedience and in both cases the analogy to the Mafia is apt. Does not the Mafia have the form of a feudal system? Recall the origins, the values, as Eric Hobsbawm brings out, the Mafia was born probably in response to feudalism, to city-states or foreign occupation, I forget what.

Go back to the question, - why is this not done more? As I said, it is because it is prone to fail, difficult, maybe beyond one's capabilities to coordinate; difficult to bring off successfully, less, in short reliable partly because of its complexity and its extraordinary demand. Any more systematic approach of bringing all this together, mobilizing, using large force that cannot be kept secret but which is large enough to overwhelm.

In large and especially relatively open systems, the element that may be difficult to achieve with a fait accompli is simply the secrecy especially if it's a large operation. If it's not to be a large operation, it's very smallness makes it prone to be encountered even by a relatively weak opponent if the secrecy is not maintained or even if it is.

Notice the traditional armies disrespect and distaste for special operations, for special units which rely on smallness, secrecy and speed and extraordinary capability. They regard it as magic bullets, as panaceas, partly because if they are adequate or successful they don't call for large forces, large staffs, large headquarters, large budgets since they're antithetical to the major peacetime priorities of the service or perhaps even wartime. It's partly because they are distrusted as likely to fail and perhaps for encouraging political leaders to get into conflicts that should be avoided because they promise a cheap and quick success. So the army, just as Powell and Schwarzkopf who were opposed to an airforce only strategy or any clever strategies that relied on small forces. They insisted on having very large forces in place, fully adequate to reduce the chance of failure and perhaps ultimately reduce even the cost by their overwhelming nature though they would be still costly in money and other things compared to a very clever strategy if that could succeed or an airforce alone strategy.

Perhaps assassination was the method of choice with Diem and consider other cases, probably regarded as one of the keys to the

success of the Bay of Pigs operation and almost surely also to any Nicaraguan invasion that relied heavily on assassination of the directorate. In the case of Iraq, the assassination of Saddam was not necessary to the achievement of a quick victory but the failure to assassinate him did deprive Bush both of the total sense of vindication and success given the aims he had indicated but also marred the overall sense of the victory not only because Saddam wasn't there but because Saddam in power used brutality against the Kurds and the Shiites effectively which however acceptable to the U.S. Administration or even desirable was seen as deplorable by right-wing critics and by the public at large.

Fait accompli is for some maybe the only method available to a relatively weaker power since it promises the possibility of success with literally small forces against normally strong defenses. The strong defenses of course are often allowed to be discontinuous in time because of some presumption that the aggressor is unable to move sufficiently fast or in a coordinated measure compared to one's warning capabilities and one's response capabilities, so one will be able to alert, man the defenses adequately, make them impregnable, in time given enough warning or you had to preempt the attack if necessary on the assumption that the other side takes time to attack, has space to cover, has a sequence of steps that must be followed which are sufficiently visible to one's warning capabilities, that the effect will be under attack as if one's defenses were continuously alert, continuously available, they will be there when they are needed. This presumption may be foiled if the other side is able to coordinate better, to move faster and/or to move more invisibly in various stages in preparations for planning, in decision making and in actual movement more than the defender imagines is possible.

NOTE: In my comments on my own Irvine lectures, criticisms of my theory and purpose of blackmail or perhaps of my Irvine lecture itself. I note that a frequent risk; I don't emphasize in the lectures enough the risks of the blackmail approach or one could say the fait accompli approach. And one of those risks is that one overestimates the rationality of the opponent, the degree to which his actions are predicated upon calculations of future benefit and cost as opposed to being either reflex actions, habitual actions, actions under authority, the authority having different values or non-rational responses in the sense that the initial values are themselves changed by the new circumstances and by one's own actions so that the new rational calculations are different from what they would have been earlier, less favorable to oneself. Examples of these new calculations may include a desire to restore lost honor, for showing decisiveness demonstrated, and bold risk taking, a manly desire to vindicate and take revenge.

This is why blackmail may fail, in other words the other side just doesn't calculate rationally or has different and perhaps less rational values than one supposed. But the same is true of the fait accompli, that in turn, aims to affect a rational calculation into precluding a violent response which would be irrational but the perpetrator of the fait accompli often overlooks the non-rational effect, just as, by the way, a violent approach may underestimate the degree to which it makes the other side irrational, that is resolute and desirous of revenge, fanatically determined even in the face of overwhelming odds, so that the opponents simply will not accept defeat, either that has somehow been achieved by normal standards as in the case of Vietnam or is willing to accept irrationally immense damage, destruction and fight on and continue to inflict losses on oneself, be willing to take the ten to one.

Here Saddam thought that his threat of madness was adequate, his willingness to accept exorbitant casualties as in the Iran-Iraq War. He said to April Glaspe, yours is a society that cannot accept ten thousand dead in a single battle. What society should? Why should he accept that? He thought that he had a proven capability to do that, a kind of madness. He was using madness politically as in his threats to scorch half of Israel with a clear implication that would lead to the total destruction of Iraq or his threats to harm the ecology of the whole gulf by burning and destroying Kuwait's oil vindictively by firing the oil fields. Something he did do and of course he threatened poison gas. So he felt he had demonstrated this kind of ruthlessness or madness sufficiently. In the end of course, he didn't turn out to be capable of inflicting ten thousand casualties, that was one problem, nor was he willing to use the gas unless it is the case that his command capabilities, coordinating use of them which was necessary, was destroyed so he didn't have the physical capability to do that. A gas attack requires to be effect a relatively coordinated attack. He could still have achieved considerable psychological effect, if he'd wanted, by an uncoordinated attack but at great cost which he proved to rational to accept.

Notice that in these various approaches of blackmail and fait accompli that one is confronting an opponent, a leadership and a followership, an armed forces or a police force, that is obligated to respond or defend or to punish or to destroy oneself under many circumstances but not quite all circumstances. On the one hand, the leaders are not clearly obligated to respond if responding would be a greater evil or would lead to greater evil than not responding, even though the not responding is in the circumstances, an evil. It's a bad situation. It's against one's interests. It has made one worse off but responding might be even worse so there is a necessity you want to create, a necessity defense for the authorities or the followers, a necessity defense for not fulfilling one's obligations since one

is legally or politically or morally or honorably obligated to do so.

The necessity defense is that doing so would be even worse, would be a greater evil or would lead to greater evil, than your non response for acceptance in this bad situation is a lesser evil. You want to give the other side a necessity defense in face of its own courts. As Bowie put it to Kennedy in the case of the Frenchman who was being tried in court, a lieutenant, for not having fired his weapons against the attacking enemy, the Germans, he said, I had seven reasons; first, we had no ammunition. He's not obligated to do it if he has no ammunition. Under other circumstances, even if he did have ammunition, you could say that the prospects were so low that he was not really obligated to do it or was it was not reasonable, not responsible, it was too destructive with his own men to do it. Even though, he is supposed to be a military man, he is supposed to be willing to sacrifice himself and his men and to kill others if there is even a small chance of success but not clearly obligated to do it when he's been totally surrounded, overwhelmed, or outmanned and where there is essentially no chance of success.

In other words, under some circumstances surrender is acceptable in the small and of course the same is true in the large, where the prospects of success are simply too small. Thus a new history of the Civil War is very critical of Lee in that Lee fought on, choose to fight on even long after he knew that there were no prospects of success. This, at great destruction to the South. He is criticized for that even though in the Southern traditions he is normally honored for the gallant fight against overwhelming odds. Horatius at the bridge, beloved by Livermore's Lowell Wood as well as by myself in my earlier days. For how can men die better than facing fearful odd for the ashes of his fathers and the temple of his god. For authority, for masculine tradition, respect for fathers and dignity and so forth and precisely against fearful odds, even suicidally. However, even Horatius choose to save himself at the last moment after the bridge had gone down, tried to save himself and ordered the others to go back over the bridge before it fell at some risk that because of their retreat he would fail to stop the advancing hoard.

The Spartans at Thermopoly held the path against overwhelming odds even at their certain death but they are particularly honored for doing that, for extraordinary behavior. The usual objective is to confront the opponent with overwhelming odds so much so that he will not fight to the death but will surrender. Give up, you're surrounded, you have no chance, no choice, come out with your hands up. That is why the state has not a total monopoly of force but it aims at an overwhelming amount of force so it can achieve this compliance with minimum violence or with no violence by confronting the other side with

overwhelming violence where the odds of success are negligible. This affect can be achieved against a generally stronger opponent or an equal opponent, equal in size, or, if not equal one with great strength, great destructive power normally by taking advantage of its monopoly over the means of coercion.

[END OF SIDE 3 (SIDE A OF SECOND CASSETTE)].

[CONTINUE TO SIDE 4 (SIDE B OF SECOND CASSETTE)].

The fait accompli, the surprise attack, tries to take advantage, to win, to keep an even stronger opponent from using its strength by attacking when on alert as when the Jewish middle-weight champion, or light-weight, was hit by a drunken bar, rival, by hitting him in the solar plexus and rupturing his diaphragm, hitting him when his diaphragm was not alerted. In the case of blackmail or threats, hopes to avert this by threatening to do something which the opponent, even though perhaps much stronger, is not able to prevent that piece of destructive or damaging behavior though it could punish it. And if one can make it credible then one will carry out this threat despite the possibility of being destroyed oneself, even to a greater degree; as a consequence, one can induce even a stronger victim to comply along with this behavior rather than to set into motion this mutually destructive process even though in mutual destruction the major destruction might be experienced by the weaker party. It's better, it's a lesser evil to go along. The authorities have a necessity defense.

In effect then, the reason sometimes one wants to be confronted with a fait accompli rather than with a slower approach, this is a crucial point, is that in that case one has a necessity defense. One can say would be a greater evil to set in process a cycle of retaliation and violence with its uncertainties than to accept this lesser evil. One has a necessity defense. I didn't have the ability. It wasn't worth it to respond even though it is generally my obligation to prevent this from happening, which I've failed to do, and to respond to it if it does happen; whereas, Eisenhower was not given that necessity defense for accepting the British and French action because they were simply too slow. He was angry at that as well, that they had embarrassed him by forcing him to take this action.

In doing civil disobedience, people are often trying to use the necessity defense on the grounds that our illegal action is a lesser evil though under other circumstances it would be illegal or wrong because it has, we claim, for legal purposes, the ability to prevent an evil action from taking place. Actually, of course, as the judge often ruled, it doesn't prevent that. It couldn't be reasonably be said to prevent it and therefore is not an effective defense. The real defense would be that our action

is not only shaped with some reasonable expectation of succeeding but is indeed necessary to alert a society, to warn, to capture their attention dramatically by ones' own unusual dramatic act or willingness to sacrifice and go to jail, to capture the attention for a problem and thus to get society, sovereign public to take action often against either private or generally public authorities who are abusing their authority or are unalert, not acting covertly.

We want to get the sovereign public or other elites or other parts of the government to see a problem, both a physical and a moral problem, a long run problem and to alert themselves and to act in time when usually it's not a case of an adversary working against us at this point and a foreign adversary but where our domestic authorities are either acting illegally wrongly, perhaps in killing other people in the course of the war, or are planning a war. One might be trying to act in time against a natural process such as the production of radioactive wastes that cannot be safely stored or the preparation inadvertently of an eventual mechanical or radioactive catastrophe as in nuclear power plants where the breakdown of a mutual warning system in an inadvertent war or the destruction of the ozone layer, global warming, pollution and so forth. All of these processes are very long term threats, are dangerous over time but the response takes a great deal of time and is not being currently considered or prepared or undertaken with sufficient urgency to deal with the catastrophic threat even though the catastrophic threat is itself a very slow and long term process. The response is also very slow, long term, massive and if not being done in time the civil disobedience then is an act to alert people to the need for urgency for unusual coordination, unusual centralization of planning and decision making, preferably democratically achieved. The civil disobedience is meant to be a catalyst to that response.

The practical problem is one of focusing attention, of alerting, of mobilizing, and perhaps of causing a change of heart, a change in concern, in values both of which lie outside the usual purview of economist' analysis of rational action where the problem is supposed to be given and the values are given even the alternatives are given as distinct from a possible need for search and invention of new alternatives or a change in priorities and values or a shift in attention and which problems being looked at, considered. Thus, civil disobedience is directed and affected elements of the situation which are either not considered in the usual economic analysis or rational action or are considered to be given, changeable factors in a situations, subject to purposive change in the interests of certain principles.

Just as blackmail tries to maintain the rationality of the opponent and to keep a hand on him in effect as Barbara Deming

says, - nonviolence does, to discourage him. After all, nonviolent, direct action is a form usually of coercion or prevention. It does so keeping one hand on the opponent, keeping him from vertigo, from becoming dizzy, from impulsive, violent action, from losing control of himself and thus in the case of nonviolence, seeing one's joint interests or feeling a joint concern, not losing sight, not becoming lost in desires for revenge. You're trying to make the person not only remain rational in his reactions but in his values in having a proper sense of self interest as opposed to losing the sense of self interest and a desire for revenge. And nonviolent, direct action usually tries to do that by appealing to joint interests and to a sense that the new situation will be better for both not merely, not worse for the other person. Whereas blackmail ambiguously has to accept the other person will see the situation as worse and as a diminution, as a deprivation, as a worsening. But rather than getting lost in a desire to retaliate or revenge or taking imprudent, risky action to change the situation, tries to keep him focused on the longer run and on the real risks and on the possibility of coming out, of the likelihood of coming out even worse if he tries to respond.

The *fait accompli* likewise aims at maintaining or inducing the rationality of the opponent in the same terms and therefore it's essential to paralyze or stop the action, the response long enough or to move so fast that even in the course of contemplating response, there's a considerable time interval before that response could be effective during which the opponent, the victim has time to reflect, to calculate, to receive one's messages, to consult and to act not irrationally passively. That unwanted or unexpected passivity may characterize the very first reaction not for reasons of irrationality but of simple inability to react fast enough or to be warned in time. But there's a later period in which you hope to slow the response so that the new situation will be seen as an accomplished fact in the hopes that the opponent, the victim will respond to facts, to reality, not to internal desires for revenge or to changed angry values or to resort to simple habitual impulses that will if necessary disrupt routines, avoid habitual reaction, take short term losses and so forth domestically rather than to react as you would have expected him to want to earlier in the light of quote, - "the new situation, the new reality, the accomplished fact".

This can all be seen, the *fait accompli*, as attempting to shift the zero of the utility function in the Kahneman-Tversky sense in order to change the regions of gains and losses, of negative and positive. This, again, being ignored by ordinary economics or even Savage type decision theory as a consideration but which Kahneman-Tversky show is very important. Another Kahneman-Tversky principle shows how the *fait accompli* can fail. If the new situation does not succeed quickly in reframing the situation and in changing the zero point, the status quo, the

zero point that divides positive from negative, gains from losses; then it runs into another characteristic which is that the new situation which is created, is still seen as negative or as a potential negative, cause zero has not been changed to a new status quo point. So this is still seen as a definite loss and perhaps as an impending loss that either has to be reversed quickly to come out even, or averted. And in either of those cases the person will take the unusual risks of still greater loss, risks that he ordinarily would not make sense to take simply to make a certain small gain, for example. But to avert this small loss, that certain and impending loss, he will now take enormous risks and this is the gambling with catastrophe situation.

You have the risk of putting your opponent into a gambling with catastrophe mode, where he's willing to take enormous risks of loss in order to regain the previous status quo which is still recognized as a status quo, as a break even point. So, as I say, this whole thing can be seen then as an attempt to shift the status quo. Another risk that the fait accompli gives rise to or in the case of the surprise attack, it may cause a preemptive strike with all its risks. In other words, striking second first. The preemption is of course again a surprise, a very hastily carried out strike, unexpected usually and with the intention, - perhaps smaller than fully mobilized forces, just with alert forces - but with the intention of exploiting the peculiar vulnerability of the other side's forces while it is in the process of attacking or about to attack. It may be, in some senses, unusually vulnerable at that point. For example, all its forces may be on the ground instead of some being in the air or being prepared. They may all be subject to attack. Well that was the premise, as in the fait accompli, likewise in the surprise attack, there may be an early stage in which the process is particularly vulnerable and that encourages preemption with all its risks.

Another point; in the public eyes, (see my note here on public axioms or conservative axioms) there is a presumption in favor of any given status quo and against changes in the status quo even though that status quo is seen as in some cases - unjust, unfair, illegitimate. Nevertheless, to the extent that changes in it are seen as themselves, possibly a greater evil than the lesser evil of allowing the status quo to maintain, because the change itself is seen as evolving uncertain events and as taking great risks, as hurting people psychology by causing them to shift their view of thing psychologically, causing pain. But as possibly leading to chaos, to lack of coordination, lack of leadership, lack of authority.

That brings up the next point. The public, like conservatives, the public is conservative on this point, tends to favor any authority, the maintenance of any authority, to some

degree, even an unjust or illegitimate authority, rather than destroying it, in fear of losing any authority, any centralization, any coordination, any leadership, any assurance, security that goes with authority at all and of coming out perhaps with a worse one, with an ultimate authority that is even worse. So tampering with authority, traditions, symbols of authority or figures of authority is an undermining of instincts of obedience, even questioning authority, is all seen as dangerous, not only by conservatives but by a large part of the public. Above all, of course, in wartime or in cold war conditions but also in peace time, when that is seen as laced with various threats to our interests as requiring basically a U.S. superiority or hegemony if possible because of our need to scratch for scarce resources, energy, our need to protect our borders from dope, from terrorism, by the Third World, even from economic competition and from reassessment of debts or repudiation of debts which would have great consequences on our domestic system and requires U.S. to run things, to the largest extent possible.

In that quasi war-like situation, there's a special need for authority, for leadership. It's a necessity defense for unjust leadership. Now that means then that in Kahneman-Tversky's sense again that the status quo is seen as the current authorities. That the current authorities continue to hold their position is seen as good not only by the authorities themselves who see tremendous need for them and society, to maintain that position. But there is a good deal of agreement for that in the society, including the opposing party, as one sees in the reluctance to seek impeachment of either Reagan or Bush or earlier Nixon or to even consider it with Kennedy or Johnson, much as they deserved that. Interesting question, does this apply to Eisenhower or Truman with his Korean War? Was Eisenhower in fact as guilty in practical terms of impeachable offenses as were the others? He did a lot of covert operations. He took enormous risks for the future with his nuclear policies. The question whether that could be easily argued to be an impeachable activity whereas in the case of Kennedy, in a variety of ways, certainly of Nixon, Johnson, question Ford, probably not, question Carter, certainly Reagan, certainly Bush, guilty of impeachable offenses for which they really should have been impeached aside from this precedent feature of diminishing authority altogether and of undue change in arrangements of both foreign and domestic policy.

Back on the correspondence between surprise attacks and fait accompli. I notice that the Japanese in fact benefitted, whether they counted on doing so or not, from a certain willingness of FDR to see certain aggressive actions on their part although he did not anticipate Pearl Harbor but he did in effect turn his eyes away from the likelihood of aggression on their part rather than seeking to the utmost to deter it or prevent it because he, in effect, wished to be confronted with a surprise attack or a

fait accompli. It took a different form from what he had expected but even that, had he fully anticipated it, is not out of the question that he could accept it as his Republican opponents have often charged that he did or suspected that he did.

They were capable of suspecting that an American president, at least a Democrat, was capable of duplicity on this scale in order to use that fait accompli to make it a fait malaccompli but to use it to mobilize the public for resistance in another line, that is, against Hitler. That was his way of getting public from anger at the Japanese into acceptance of war with Hitler. Now in this case, of course, strictly speaking, Hitler did declare war. And it's even yet fully clear that FDR could have gotten us into war against Hitler without that declaration. But he almost surely would have wanted to and to give that war higher priority than the war against the Japanese. But anyway, the Japanese may even have realized it to some extent. FDR was cooperating and being fooled on this point because of a willingness to be confronted with a fait accompli.

Not all of the attacks by the Japanese, in fact most of them were not surprises, although Pearl Harbor itself was, I believe, in the face of some evidence on the other hand that it may not have been. The appearance to the public was America was totally taken by surprise by all of the Japanese moves, not only Pearl Harbor. But Roberta Wohlstetter really implies that the attack on Pearl Harbor was lost in noise but that noise consisted of preparations for other attacks which were expected and which did occur. They weren't just feints. It was not as though those other attacks were simply feints to cover Pearl Harbor and in effect the other attacks actually being prepared served as very useful cover in the way of preparation for offensive attacks, for the additional attack on Pearl Harbor.

After all it's often very hard to know just where an attack is directed. If you can spot preparations for attack A, it may be very hard to infer from that if you haven't already guessed it, if you're not already disposed to guess it that the attack will include A and B. Much easier to notice that an attack is being prepared for somewhere than to know exactly where, and if the place to be attacked seems out of range, as Pearl Harbor did, seems unlikely to be attacked for a number of reasons. It's easy to miss those signals. In other words the conspiratorial theory of FDR's behavior, makes inferences as if the attack on Pearl Harbor which was, in fact, one of the first attacks in time was the only attack being prepared, the only significant one and that somehow FDR had implausibly, was claiming to have missed all preparations for attack.

The other side to that is, the fact that he did not respond adequately to the attack on Pearl Harbor, was part of a pattern

in which he did not respond to any of the attacks fully because he was willing to see them happen rather than to warn the world of them, to give an ultimatum, to make other preparations. There was a complicity in letting those attacks happen, very similar now - look at the reaction of April Glaspe and others to Kuwait. It was something of a surprise that he invaded Kuwait but a total surprise that he invaded all of Kuwait. The attack, if any, was expected elsewhere, to be only part of Kuwait. And there was a complicity in accepting that rather than warning it off, preventing it which might have been done. That complicity then looks like in retrospect a complicity in the entire attack, raises at least a question of whether they did not understand that the entire attack was coming. It's exactly parallel to the Pearl Harbor case. The Japanese went beyond what they were expected to do or added something to what they were expected to do, added something unexpected.

There is a presumption in the public mind against changing a status quo or challenging an authority for fear in each case of something worse, the uncertainties of the process and the possibility that a leaderless situation, lacking any authority and any coordination will occur, a disorder in which people are both uncertain, fearful of the future and in fact suffering great conflict, a situation such as gang warfare in South Central L.A., such as we saw in the movie the other day, chaotic situation with a lot of random firing going on; bystanders and innocent people getting killed and subject to constant terror and to ferocious police tactics in turn which are again accepted to some degree in lieu of a lack of any order or as being necessary.

The bad aspects of the situation include both the challenges to authority and the acts of authority, the interaction. And where there is a fear of losing Daryl Gates for fear of getting either not sufficient authority or conceivably someone worse. By the way, probably it is possible to get somebody even more brutal and racist than Gates and that he's probably not the worst available or conceivable. It would probably be easy to get someone worse, less competent or less clever, more brutal, more authoritarian than Saddam Hussein despite the analogies of Hitler. Hitler is still coming close to pinning down a bad end of the scale in terms of very unlikely to get worse, although it could have been less competent, not clear that would have been worse for other people. He could have been even more reckless than he was though not easily.

You can always get more brutal. Hitler's willingness to be brutal probably had very few limits as for that matter did Stalin's when it came to challenges to his internal authority in the Soviet empire though not in his terms of desire to expand that empire or to challenge the international status quo, very different from Hitler in that respect but not particularly different in domestic means of control and willingness to use

lies, brutality, genocide.

The *fait accompli* is then an attempt to, indeed to challenge authority of another power and perhaps to displace it, perhaps with assassination and certainly to challenge the status quo. All of these seen as illegitimate but the purpose is to establish quickly enough a new situation so that before an effective defense or a counter can really be mounted, time will elapse and the new situation will come to be accepted as a new status quo or a new set of authorities and leadership figures over a territory such that to challenge that takes on the onus now of being a challenge to the status quo, a challenge to authority, threatening the loss of all authority and so forth, to shift the zero point. It's an analogy to gaining the advantage of defenses of either natural defense like a river or a set of cliffs or bluffs or of a set of fortifications, to have them on your side rather than on the opponents side, to gain quickly. What is the use of gaining them since they did not protect the person in the first place? Well, the reason they didn't was, the reason they were ineffective was they are not effective at all times or they require a certain amount of surveillance and manning and response capability and which is not at all times alert. And if the new authority can plug those holes, in effect can maintain a high state of alert longer or the other side is less capable of a surprising *fait accompli* which is the vulnerability of the defenses and he does gain the effect of those defenses more effectively than the original possessors and certainly in the short run, he does while he's still in a high state of alert.

During that short run, one can get the new status quo accepted. So Israel takes the Golan Heights away from Syria or a river line achieved. So one gains the advantage of that. Just as that's clear, one wants to have these geographical features working for one's advantage instead of the other, likewise, you want time. You need to stop the other person's response long enough to gain the psychological, moral, political advantage of legitimacy, *de facto* legitimacy, *de facto* authority, a *de facto* new status quo; to challenge which, not only has an onus of illegitimacy against it, an onus of public reluctance. Just as there was great public reluctance for a Senate, House, and Congress and the authority of elites in general for challenging the new status quo in Kuwait and in effect initiating first violence against Iraq. Iraq not having committed violence against us and indeed very little violence against anybody. Though the ongoing impression of taking the hostages turned out to work against Saddam severely for a period of time while we were making our preparations and the reports of gratuitous violence against Kuwaitis which certainly could have been postponed or just foregone, that worked very much against him. It seemed as though he was taking first violence.

In the large here, what I am doing is first suggesting to

people that they see the world and specifically crises of international behavior as processes of conflict or as Schelling would say, - mixed conflict and collaboration in which part of the skill of the conflict is to draw on the elements or create elements of collaboration or induce collaboration or compliance, to induce. This would all be very interesting to discuss with Schelling. I don't know if Schelling ever actually saw my theory and practice of blackmail but not necessarily some of the other political uses of madness. Yes, he must have. But this is all very Schelling like except that one adds the awareness of non-rationality, of irrationality to it as an emphasis in the risks of this approach and the ways in which these approaches can fail, something that Schelling doesn't re-emphasize. He puts all the emphasis on how it can be done.

Adversarial processes, processes of mixed conflict and collaboration but on which all the calculation is not rational. There is a risk of non rational reaction and indeed of the goals is to avert that but a goal that often fails, in part because the likelihood of it is underestimated and the likelihood that one stimulates essentially non rational, non calculating, non purely self interested that are even at all self interested action, revengeful, hateful action or habitual action that's destructive or gets out of control in the likelihood of actual loss of control. Schelling certainly talks about exploiting the risk, the threat of loss of control but doesn't spend at all enough attention to the likelihood that that risk will actually be achieved including in ones own clever processes.

The "Days of Thunder" line about, infantile egomaniacs not realizing that control is an illusion. They cannot really predict or control or manage the outcomes. The whole idea then of crisis management, supposedly invented by McNamara after the Cuban Missile Crisis certainly leads to his greatest lesson later which he attributes to Cuba but probably really achieved much more in Vietnam, that control was an illusion, that these were not to be managed. Of course he did not regard the Cuban Missile Crisis, one wonders even if he really did say - crisis management, use that phrase. It's much more of a Walt Rostow phrase because McNamara was genuinely afraid of loss of control and genuinely ready to compromise rather than to experience that.

In Cuba, - to get back to Cuba, - in the larger setting I'm looking at conflict. I'm looking at aspects of command and control, speed of response, of foresight and the effects on the tension and alertness and mobilization, readiness that are not usually looked at in rational calculations or rationality, non rational effects of humiliation, pride, revenge, fear, that are not usually looked at. The Kahneman-Tversky aspect of gains and losses and the possibility of shifting or reframing the objectives of shifting the frame, or the status quo with a zero,

the authorities, but at the same time at the risk of failing to do so and evoking not only effectively rational, clever, effective counter response but evoking also and/or a non rational, furious, possibly effective but possibly catastrophic response, posing the opposing leaders to gamble with catastrophe.

Now this possibility may be foreseen and itself be a reflection of a willingness to gamble with catastrophe rather than to see a status quo reversed, a crises situation in which one sees a threat to a domestic position, let's say, which the opponent is not conscious exists for one or is not conscious for creating for one. Again, in the larger sense, I'm emphasizing elements of surprise, of secrecy and lies, of deception as factors, but also the general subject of threat and of uncertainty and the depiction and control of uncertainty.

Someone who read this analysis would probably be able to see all kinds of applications in personal relationships, small group relationships as well as in international politics, certainly in domestic affairs as well as international. Indeed a major point is the relation of domestic and personal psychological factors along with international calculations. So it is very much not a rational actor model in which the state is personified as having certain rational objectives or the whole system but it is an individual action, while it's a political action model, but it is an individual action model of in which the great emphasis put on the president in the individual state. That is personal psychology which is of course not wholly rational but which is in many ways rational, more rational than frequently appears from puzzling paradoxical, surprising behavior, apparently incoherent behavior exhibited by states and even by presidents.

When, one takes into account, a hidden set of preferences and proclivities and concerns and considerations other than those evinced by the president or by the state or inferred by political scientists who think states have only international considerations or only those that are acknowledged or only national security in a narrow sense. This is as against, let's say, the bureaucratic politics, model which is of importance but of secondary importance and which serves the function, to a large extent, of concealing the other aspects which are at least as important and I would say much more important, of presidential responsibility, accountability. In this sense the bureaucratic politics model has the function of serving plausible denial for the president. See the reference recently against the notion in review of Draper against plausible denial. Plausible denial not just the U.S. responsibility but presidential responsibility, a denial of and accountability for, a denial for his actual values preferences, power, control influence on events.

One other point; notice the importance of bygones not being bygones, the importance of precedent affecting very strongly the people who either participated in that preference or participated

as rivals and opponents of a particular decision and do not want to reproduce it or be charged with making the same mistake or error which they had denounced as an error. Thus, a generation of democrats of being unwilling to risk Chinese entry into the war in Vietnam after the debacle in Korea. The Republicans being unwilling to do what they saw as the democratic error of overthrowing Diem in assassinating a later head of state in Vietnam. Earlier I was saying that this reckless gambles and surprise attacks do come out of a sense of crisis, a sense that a status quo is threatened when the opponent is often not at all aware of the sense in which he is threatening or someone else is threatening the status quo of the rivals, is not aware that the other side has experienced a crises. That was very true of the Japanese before Pearl Harbor, the Chinese before they were attacked in Korea.

[END OF SIDE 4].

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION].